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Einstein, Science and Philosophy
Friedel Weinert
Albert Einstein (…) is a Kantian and a Greek





1 On  September  26,  1905  Albert Einstein’s  paper  ‘On  the  Electrodynamics  of  Moving
Bodies’ appeared in the Annalen der Physik. It is generally agreed that it is one of the
most  important  scientific  papers  ever  written.  But  was  it  a  revolutionary  paper?
Einstein  generalizes  the  Galilean  relativity  principle  to  include  electro-magnetic
phenomena; he postulates the velocity of light in vacuum as an upper speed limit on all
phenomena.  He uses  the Lorentz  transformations  for  the calculation of  spatial  and
temporal measurements in the transition from one reference frame to another. There
is much to be said for the view that Einstein’s Special theory of relativity completes
classical  physics,  especially  the  work  of  James C. Maxwell.  [Holton  2000]  Einstein
himself did not see his theory as a ‘revolutionary act’. But Einstein’s work did introduce
a  philosophical  revolution  in  our  fundamental  notions.  This  means  that  general
notions,  like  mass,  energy,  time,  space,  causation,  determinism,  which  are  used  in
human attempts  to  construct  coherent  schemes  of  nature,  have  undergone  radical
changes as a result of scientific discoveries, such as those associated with the Special
and General theory of relativity (STR, GTR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM). According to
Max Born the revision of  old concepts has to happen under the constraints of  new
experience.  [Born 1949,  75]  We can consider  them as  physico-philosophical  notions
because they are not tied to any particular physical theory and have often been the
subject  of  philosophical  reflection  from  the  Greeks  to  the  present  day.
Hans Reichenbach  characterized  Einstein  as  a  philosopher  by  implication  but  also
speaks of the ‘philosophical consequences’ of Einstein’s work. [Reichenbach 1949, 310]
(cf. [Howard 2004]) That is, Einstein was willing to consider the status of the physico-
philosophical  notions  in  the  light  of  his  scientific  discoveries.  It  may  be  more
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appropriate to characterize Einstein’s philosophical innovations as consequences of his
scientific work. Implications can be hidden in the logic of a situation. But Einstein and
many  other  physicists  of  his  generation  were  fully  aware  of  the  philosophical
dimensions of their scientific work. I  prefer therefore to speak of the philosophical
consequences of Einstein’s work. In order to appreciate what is meant by philosophical
consequences,  we  should  distinguish  them  from  the  deductive  consequences  of
physical  theories.  A  deductive consequence follows from the principles  and internal
logic of the theory. It is a deductive consequence of the premises of STR that reference
frames do not share a universal time axis.  A philosophical consequence of a physical
theory concerns its conceptual features. Certain conceptual positions are compatible or
incompatible  with  the  theory  but  they  are  not  directly  testable  and are  subject  to
interpretations. For instance a notion of absolute time is incompatible with the theory
of  relativity.  But  physicists  and  philosophers  have  argued,  alternatively,  that  the
theory of relativity can be made compatible with a static or a dynamic view of time.
The  philosophical  consequences  of  the  theory  of  relativity  extend  far  beyond  the
familiar  reshaping  of  the  notions  of  space  and  time.  What  made  Einstein  a  great
physicist  was  his  ability  to  question  unquestioned  assumptions  in  the  tradition  of
physical  theorizing.  What  made  him  an  even  greater  physicist  was  his  ability  to
recognize  the  limits  of  his  own work.  This  talent  led  him from the  Special  to  the
General theory of relativity and beyond to attempts to construct a unified field theory.
What made him a decent philosopher was his willingness to pursue the philosophical
consequences  of  his  physical  discoveries,  e.g.,  regarding  the  physico-philosophical
notions.
2 Einstein followed the logic of the problem situation, which his physical discoveries had
created, into the field of philosophy. A problem situation indicates that at any time, t, in
the  history  of  science  there  exist  perceived  problems,  which  attract  a  number  of
tentative solutions [Popper 1963,  198–200];  for instance the great puzzle of the 17th
century was to know why planets stay in their orbits around the sun; some of these
tentative solutions will  be eliminated;  for a certain period of time, t+t',  usually one
theory  survives  and  is  regarded  in  the  scientific  community  as  the  most  adequate
theory in the light of the available evidence. If the available evidence is inconclusive
with regard to competing theories, it may still be possible, as we shall see, to appeal to
other constraints to achieve a distribution of credibility over the competitors. These
tentative solutions include philosophical presuppositions, which may change under the
impact of scientific discoveries. For instance, classical physics presupposes a unique
time axis for all reference frames; a presupposition, which became questionable with
the  emergence  of  the  STR.  To  regard  Einstein  as  a  philosopher  is  to  consider  his
position  on  a  number  of  philosophical  issues.  Einstein  philosophizes  within  the
constraints  of  science,  in particular  his  science.  His  questions are familiar  to  every
philosopher  of  science:  How do  theories  relate  to  the  external  world?  What  is  the
nature of reality? What is the nature of time and space? What is the status of scientific
theories? What does quantum mechanics tell us about reality? Given the principle of
relativity, what is to be regarded as the real?
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II. Facts and Concepts
3 As Einstein philosophizes within the ambit of the theory of relativity, he sets these
philosophical  questions  within  a  concrete  scientific  problem  situation.  His  answers
derive  their  significance  from this  problem situation.  The  problem situation  is  the
kinematics  of  reference  frames,  given  the  results  of  classical  mechanics  and
electromagnetism.  Historically,  his  first  concern was  the  notion of  time.  When the
Special  theory  of  relativity  was  generalized  to  the  General  theory,  his  second
philosophical  worry  became the  notion of  space—or more precisely  space-time,  for
Einstein had accepted Minkowski’s four-dimensional representation of the relativity
theory. But with hindsight we can reorder his philosophical concerns into a logically
more coherent picture.
4 Einstein’s fundamental philosophical position arises from the age-old puzzle of how a
body  of  concepts  is  related  to  collection  of  facts.  More  generally,  how do  abstract
scientific  theories  relate  to  concrete  empirical  data?  How  do  scientific  theories
represent empirical reality? Such questions of representation go beyond the immediate
concern of  scientists  who could contend themselves with the solution of  particular
technical problems. However such questions lie in the nature of scientific theorizing, as
the  Greek  astronomer  Ptolemy  already  knew.  Once  a  theoretical  account,  like
geocentrism, is available the question arises: to which extent is it an accurate account
of the real world? As we shall see, Einstein’s solution to this question, with respect to
the  theory  of  relativity,  can  be  cast  in  terms  of  scientific  constraints.  Einstein’s
philosophical  worry  derived  from  his  dissatisfaction  with  Newtonian  physics  as  a
fundamental  theory.  When Einstein aired his  worry,  for instance in his  Obituary of
Ernst Mach (1916), he warned against the Kantian tendency to regard certain concepts
as thought necessities. Once certain concepts have been formed, often on the basis of
experience, there is a danger that they will quickly take on an independent existence.
People  are  tempted  to  regard  them  as  necessary  presuppositions,  without  which
science cannot be done. For instance, for two thousand years astronomers regarded the
circle as the only permissible orbit of planets. Concepts, however, just like theories, are
always subject to revisions. Einstein complained that 
Concepts, which have proved useful in the ordering of things, easily acquire such a
degree of authority over us that we forget their earthly origin. We take them as
unchangeable givens. They come to bear the stamp of ‘thought necessities’, of the ‘a
priori given’. ([Einstein 1916, 102]; translated by the author)
5 What  Einstein  had  in  mind  were  the  notions  of  space  and  time.  Isaac Newton had
regarded it as necessary to introduce the notions of absolute space and time into his
mechanics in order to make sense of his laws of motion. Newton’s laws of motion make
reference to temporal and spatial notions: state of rest, rectilinear uniform motion. A
reference frame must be defined relative to which the movement of a body is ‘uniform’
or follows a ‘straight’ line. There are known rotational inaccuracies in the movement of
the earth around the sun. A straight line drawn on the surface of the earth is ‘straight’
for  a  surveyor  on  earth  but  ‘curved’  for  an  observer  in  space.  Newton  mistrusted
physical  regularities  observed  on  earth  because  they  may  contain  systematic
distortions. He required that the notions of space and time, for use in mechanics, must
be freed from all  reference to material  motions.  Newton stipulated that spatial  and
temporal notions must be absolute—independent of physical events and universal—all
observers,  whatever  their  location or  velocity  in  the universe,  must  agree on their
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temporal and spatial measurements. Few classical physicists had questioned Newton’s
reasoning,  with  the  notable  exception  of  Gottfried W. Leibniz,  Ernst Mach  and
James Maxwell. So these notions had become part and parcel of classical physics. They
had  congealed  to  philosophical  presuppositions,  to  thought  necessities,  to
unquestioned assumptions. The Special theory arrived at a different result. Temporal
and spatial measurements became relativized to particular reference frames. This was a
necessary consequence of embracing the principle of relativity and taking the velocity
of  light  as  a  fundamental  postulate  of  the  theory.  Through his  own work  Einstein
witnessed  how  such  fundamental  physico-philosophical  notions  as  time  and  space
required conceptual revision. This made him forever suspicious about the sway that
such notions could hold over people’s minds. Einstein aims at a careful balance between
concepts and facts.
6 Although  the  fundamental  notions—energy,  event,  mass,  space,  time—are  logically
speaking free inventions of the human mind, they must strike empirical roots. [Einstein
1920, 141] As Einstein’s scientific theories unfolded, several philosophical consequences
suggested themselves. This process can clearly be observed in the notion of time.
 
III. Philosophy of Being or Becoming?
7 The Special theory of relativity leads to a relativization of time to particular reference
frames.  Observers,  attached  to  different  reference  frames,  which  are  in  relative
uniform motion with respect to each other, will measure the flow of time differently. In
the present context the ancient philosophical question ‘What is time?’—which famously
puzzled Saint Augustine—reduces to the question ‘What is physical time?’ Physical time
is simply what clocks in motion tell us. Einstein time is clock time. Clock time is to be
understood in  a  broad sense.  We use  mechanical  clocks  to  measure  time intervals.
Other regular processes—sound pulses, atomic oscillations—could be used for the same
purpose. The problem is that such processes, too, are subject to relativization. Atomic
oscillations yield to gravitational forces. The wavelengths of light and sound depend on
the movement of the source, as evidenced in the Doppler Effect. In the world of special
relativity there is only one signal, which escapes this restriction. Light retains the same
velocity, c, in all directions and irrespective of whether it is emitted from a moving or
stationary source. These well-established facts led to a questioning of the traditional
notion of absolute and universal time. Well-known physicists like A. Eddington [1920],
K. Gödel [1949] and H. Weyl [1921] have claimed that the Special theory of relativity
leads to a static view of time. The argument runs as follows: the Special theory shows
that  simultaneity  cannot  be absolute,  as  Newton assumed,  since this  presupposes  a
propagation of  all  causal  influence  at  infinite  speeds.  But  Einstein’s  light postulate
shows that light propagates at finite velocity. It is a limit velocity so that no material
process can travel as fast as light. This has drastic consequences. Observers in different
reference frames, which travel at relative constant speed with respect to each other,
will not agree on the simultaneous happening of some event, E. Einstein presented a
well-known thought experiment: Let bolts of lightning strike the front and rear end of
a moving train. Do they hit the ends of the train simultaneously or not? It is the motion
of the observer, which determines the answer. For stationary observers on the platform
of a station, the events are simultaneous. For observers on the train they do not hit the
opposite ends of the train simultaneously. The reason resides in the finite propagation
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of light. The train passengers rush toward the light signal from the front and run away
from  the  rear  signal.  The  same  is  true  of  the  reading  of  clock  times  in  different
reference frames, which move with constant velocity with respect to each other. The
observers will not agree on their respective clock times. Their clocks tick differently,
depending on the state of  motion.  If  there is  no cosmic notion of  time (as Newton
assumed), to which all observers can appeal, time must pass at different rates for each
observer, depending on the speed of the reference frame. Time cannot be an objective
property of the universe. It depends on the perception of observers. The passage of
time seems to be an illusion, as Eddington, Gödel and Weyl concluded. By contrast, the
physical  universe  is  static,  a  block  universe.  Einstein  did  at  times  adopt  such  a
philosophy of being.
For us believing physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future is only
an illusion,  even if  a  stubborn one.  (Quoted in [Hoffmann 1972,  257–8])  From a
“happening”  in  three-dimensional  space,  physics  becomes,  as  it  were,  an
“existence”  in  the  four-dimensional  “world”.  [Einstein  1920,  Appendix  II,  122;
Appendix V, 150]
8 The argument infers the unreality of time from the results of the relativity theory:
numerous reference frames are seen in constant motion with respect to each other;
each reference frame carries clocks, rigid rods and perhaps an observer; the motion of
the reference frames determines different clock times, which any resident observers
will record; therefore the observers cannot agree on the simultaneity of two events and
there is no absolute simultaneity as in Newton’s mechanics; as observers cannot agree
on the simultaneity of events across different reference frames, it seems that there are
as many times as there are reference frames; the passage of time seems to be a human
illusion in the sense that there is no objective, observer-independent Now. But there are
also numerous passages in Einstein’s work, which express a more dynamic view of time.
Rather  than  speaking  of  space-time,  as  Minkowski  did,  Einstein  often  prefers  the
expression, ‘time-space’. [Einstein & Infeld 1938, 199–208] [Einstein 1922a, 29] And he
points  out  that  time  and  space  do  not  have  the  same  status  in  Minkowski’s  four-
dimensional world.
The non-divisibility of the four-dimensional continuum of events does not at all (…)
involve  the  equivalence  of  the  space  co-ordinates  with  the  time  co-ordinate.
[Einstein 1922a, 30]
9 In  his  theory of  space-time,  Einstein aligns  his  thinking to  the relationist  position,
espoused by Leibniz and Mach. According to the relational view, time and space are
nothing but the order of actual and possible events. Space is the coexistence of such
events and time is the order of succession of such coexisting events. In his deliberations
of  the  General  theory  of  relativity,  Einstein  leaves  the  reader  in  no  doubt  that  he
regards the total mass-energy distribution in the universe as the source of the space-
time metric.  ‘The gravitational field determines the metrical laws of the space-time
continuum.’ [Einstein 1922a, 59; 1922b, 20–4] What could be said in favour of such a
dynamic view? Consider first what would happen, if all references to observers were
dropped.  All  observers  can be  replaced by  clocks  and rods.  The clocks  in  different
reference systems will be affected by the respective relative motions of the systems. No
observer will conclude that there must be a mysterious transience of time—a moving
Now,  signalling the march of time from past to future. Without conscious observers,
there is  no need for the introduction of a tensed view of time,  according to which
objects change their temporal properties—their dates—by moving from past to present
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to future. The tensed view falls foul of McTaggart’s objections and is incompatible with
the findings of the Special theory of relativity. [Savitt 2000] In particular the tensed
view of time requires a privileged Now, which cannot be squared with the principle of
relativity.  Does  this  leave  us  with  a  tenseless  view of  time,  as  McTaggart  claimed,
according to which there is only a static ‘before-after’ relation between events? Events
are juxtaposed like beads on a string (B-series). The physical world just is, it is a block
universe. The passing of time is a human illusion. There is an alternative between these
extreme positions (of the tensed view versus the block universe). The tenseless view is
mistaken in equating tenselessness with changelessness. [Grünbaum 1973, 325] [Smart
1963,  138-40]  The  physical  occurrence  of  events  does  not  exclude  change.  Change
occurs  in  the  transition  between events,  even  if  these  events  are  ordered  in  four-
dimensional Minkowski space-time. Consider, for instance, the famous twin paradox.
One of the two twins is a space traveller who returns to earth after a visit to a distant
star only to find that his twin brother, who remained on earth, has aged more than he
has. This can be explained within the STR by a consideration of the effect of motion on
the world lines of the two twins: the world line of the earth-bound twin turns out to be
longer than the world line of the travelling twin [Lockwood 2005, 46–51] because the
traveller’s clock, including his biological clock, is subject to time dilation effects. If we
were to take the heart beats of the twins as our clocks, these electromagnetic signals,
which the twins exchange during the journey, will be subject to the relativistic Doppler
Effect with the result that the number of signals the twins receive respectively will not
be equal. A physical change occurs. The relational view already emphasized that time
was the order of succession of events. In the STR the relational notion of the ‘order of
successive  events’  becomes  restricted  to  the  light  cone  structure  of  Minkowski
spacetime.  The  crucial  notion  of  the  finite  propagation  of  light  in  STR  limits  the
connectibility of reference frames to time-like connected events.  It  is  interesting to
note  that  several  early  commentators  on  the  Special  theory  already  proposed  a
dynamic  interpretations  of  space-time,  according  to  which worldliness  propagate
through space-time and acquire a history. [Cunningham 1915, § 60] [Schlick 1917, 181]
[Reichenbach 1958, 183] The crucial point is that traditionally the STR only considers
purely kinematic aspects of the propagation of worldlines and the relations between
reference frames. But these kinematic relations have entropic aspects, as revealed in
the asymmetric behaviour of electromagnetic radiation. It is these entropic aspects of
worldliness,  which give the relationist  the purchase to  consider  a  dynamic view of
spacetime.  This  fits  in  well  with  a  specific  argument  from entropy,  which Einstein
employed  against  Kurt Gödel’s  idealistic  interpretation  of  the  Special  theory  of
relativity [Gödel  1949].  Einstein considers the question of  the temporal  direction of
events. Imagine we send a signal from B to A through P. This is an irreversible process.
On thermodynamic grounds he asserts that a time-like world line from B to A through P
in a light cone takes the form of an arrow making B happen before P and A after P (see
Figure I).
 
Einstein, Science and Philosophy
Philosophia Scientiæ, 13-1 | 2009
6
Figure I: Einstein's consideration of the (local) direction of time in response to Gödel's idealistic
interpretation of the Special theory of relativity. A time-like world line exists between A and B, which lies
within, not outside the light cone.
10 This secures the ‘one-sided (asymmetrical) character of time (…), i.e., there exists no
free choice for the direction of the arrow.’ [Einstein 1949a, 687] This is true at least if
points A, B and P are sufficiently close in cosmological terms. But the asymmetrical
character of time is here based on a fundamental earlier-later or before-after relation
between physical  events  without  reference to  an observer.  There is  an event,  B,  at
which the signal is emitted. And there is a later event, A, at which the signal is received.
This whole event is  irreversible.  There is  an entropy gradient between the state of
events at B and A. The assessment of this differential entropy between the two locations
does not depend on a particular reference frame. According to a fundamental result of
the Special theory of relativity the entropy of a system is frame-independent. [Einstein
1907, § 15] Thus all time-like connected frames will agree on the order of the succession
of events, even if there is disagreement about the simultaneity of these events. It may
be objected that this entropic theory of time could not form the basis for a general
dynamic  theory  of  time.  As  is  well  known the  second law of  thermodynamics  is  a
statistical principle; there is an extremely low probability of a reversal of events in our
observable space-time regions. Although it is unlikely in the life-time of the universe,
the  second  law  permits  a  spontaneous  reheating  of  a  glass  of  cold  water  by  a
rearrangement  of  the  molecules.  But  the  arrow  of  time  is  supposed  to  be  one-
directional.  This  objection  need  not  worry  the  relationist  in  the  present  context,
because the concern here is to establish the possibility of a dynamic interpretation of
space-time not on a global but local scale. Locally, the entropy gradient points in the
direction from B to A. All time-like connected observers agree. For the relationist this
establishes, within local space-time regions, an order of the succession of events and
thereby physical time for time-like related frames. Reichenbach expressed such a view
in his hypothesis of the branch structure:
The paradox of the statistical direction (of time) was solved, in a continuation of
Boltzmann’s ideas, by the recognition of the sectional nature of time direction: a
large isolated system can indeed define a time direction in a section of its whole
temporal development, if this section is rich in branch systems governed by the
laws of statistical isotropy. [Reichenbach 1956, 207] (cf. [Davies 1974, § 3.4])
11 Although Einstein endorsed, from time to time, the unreality of time, his whole theory
of time-space is relational. It points towards a philosophy of becoming since physical
time is constituted by the asymmetric, invariant order of physical events in space-time.
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There are several statements in Einstein’s work which suggest this relational reading of
his space-time concept:
I wished to show that space-time is not necessarily something to which one can
ascribe a separate existence, independently of the actual objects of physical reality.
[Einstein 1920, vi]
There can be no space nor any part of space without gravitational potentials; for
these confer upon space its metrical qualities, without which it cannot be imagined
at all.  The existence of  the gravitational  field is  inseparably bound up with the
existence of space. [Einstein 1922b, 21]
12 It  is  not  the  job  of  the  philosopher  to  put  Einstein’s  philosophical  thinking  into  a
straight-jacket.  The  philosopher  must  evaluate  whether  the  philosophical
consequences, which the physicist claims to follow from the physical discoveries, do
indeed follow. (As we have seen prominent physicists like Eddington, Gödel and Weyl
explicitly claimed that the block universe was a philosophical consequence of the STR,
whilst  Einstein  wavered  in  his  support  for  a  static  universe.)  This  is  a  question  of
conceptual  evaluation,  not  empirical  testing.  We  have  indicated  that  a  dynamic
interpretation of space-time is possible and compatible with the STR. It is possible if we
consider  the entropic  aspects  of  space-time events  and align the STR to relationist
thinking. There are similar philosophical presuppositions and consequences at work in
Einstein’s views on quantum mechanics.
 
IV. Quantum Mechanics
13 Above we characterized the philosophical consequences of scientific theories—they do
not follow deductively but are nevertheless conceptual consequences of these theories.
As  such they are  not  ‘justifiable  by  scientific  methods.’  [Frank 1949b,  355]  Einstein
revolutionized  our  philosophical  notion  of  time  by  relativizing  both  time  and
simultaneity  to  particular  inertial  reference  frames.  He  thereby  uprooted  a  prior
philosophical commitment to absolute time. Scientific revolutions or innovations often
upset  earlier  philosophical  presuppositions.  Such  presuppositions  seem  to  be
unavoidable  in  science.  But  in  his  discussions  of  quantum mechanics,  for  example,
Einstein was guided by a traditional notion of causality. In his lifelong opposition to the
Copenhagen interpretation  of  quantum mechanics  he  disregarded  the  lesson  about
thought  necessities,  which  the  theory  of  relativity  had  taught  him.  According  to
Einstein,  quantum  mechanics  was  incomplete  because  it  only  permitted  statistical
statements about ensembles of atoms. Quantum mechanics was unable to make precise
spatio-temporal  predictions about  the trajectories  of  individual  atoms.  Heisenberg’s
indeterminacy principle, whose validity Einstein fully endorses, prevents deterministic
spatio-temporal  determinations  of  atomic  trajectories.  The  ability  to  make  such
predictions  was  for  Einstein  one  of  the  fundamental  requirements  of  science.  Only
differential equations, he said, would satisfy the demand of the physicist for causality.
[Einstein  1927,  255]  Note  that  Einstein  associates  the  notion  of  causality  with  the
availability  of  differential  equations  and  therefore  predictive  determinism.  It  is  a
functional  view  of  causality,  because  it  reduces  the  causal  relation  between  two
parameters to a functional relation between the rate of change with respect to time of
one parameter,  say  velocity,  ν,  and the application of  a  force,  F.  (See  [Frank 1932]
[Weinert  2004,  ch. 5.1])  This  demand  for  deterministic  causality  is  a  reflection  of
Laplacean determinism, which the quantum theory was hoping to overcome.  When
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Einstein  warns  that  a  probabilistic  view  of  quantum  mechanics  will  lead  to  its
incompleteness,  on  the  grounds  that  it  does  not  allow  for  precise  space-time
trajectories of atomic particles, he clings to one of the most venerable presuppositions
of  classical  physics.  In  his  criticism of  Newtonian mechanics,  Einstein bemoans the
inability to jettison fundamental notions like absolute space and time. But in his view of
quantum  mechanics  he  himself  relies  on  a  presupposition  inherited  from  classical
physics, e.g. the belief in strict determinism.
14 It  has  often  been  debated  whether  Einstein’s  fundamental  worry  about  quantum
mechanics derived from fear of ‘action-at-a-distance’, rather than his belief in strict
causality.  (See [Howard 1993]  [Fine,  1986]  [Cushing & McMullin,  1989])  In  quantum
mechanics two particles, issued from a common source with particular spin alignments,
may be so far separated in space-time that no known causal interaction can take place
between them. Yet a measurement of the spin property of one particle will instantly
change the spin direction of the other particle even over cosmic distances. Einstein
found such ‘action-at-a-distance’ unpalatable. The Born interpretation offered him a
way out of the dilemma. According to the Born rule, which Einstein embraced [Einstein
1940, 923-4], the square of the wave function, |Ψ|2, only delivers statistical statements
about the probability of events, not the determination of actual events in space and
time.
15 Einstein accepted the quantum theory as a heuristic device because the Born rule told
him  that  it  only  delivered  an  incomplete  description  of  reality.  An  incomplete
description  may  not  satisfy  the  ‘causal’  demand  for  differential  equations.  This
incompleteness charge gave him the freedom to believe that a complete description of
atomic reality could be found. Einstein yearned for a complete and direct description of
reality.  [Einstein  1940,  924]  By  this  he  means  a  direct  representation of  the  actual
space-time  events,  rather  than  a  probability  distribution  of  possible  outcomes  of
measurements. Such a complete description of actual events in space-time will avoid
non-local effects. For it will be subject to the ‘strict laws for temporal dependence.’
[Einstein  1940,  923]  [Einstein  1948,  323]  In  physics  the  ‘strict  laws  for  temporal
dependence’  are  typically  expressed  in  differential  equations.  The  incompleteness
charge against  QM gave him the freedom to believe that a  complete description of
reality  would  recover  the  differential  equations,  which  described  the  temporal
evolution of real physical systems in space-time. The Schrödinger equation is of course
a  differential  equation,  which  spells  out  the  time  evolution  of  a  quantum  system.
However,  this does not satisfy Einstein,  because the Schrödinger equation describes
time evolution in an abstract Hilbert space.
16 Einstein’s insistence on a complete description of real events and his functional view of
causality leads me to agree with Fine [Fine 1986, 97–103] that Einstein’s concern with
nonlocality  was not  primary.  It  was a  consequence of  a  deeper concern with strict
causality. Einstein actually maintains that a renunciation of the principle of locality
would  render  empirically  testable  laws  impossible.  And  locality  is  expressed  in
differential  equations in real  space-time. [Einstein 1927,  261] Since the discovery of
Bell’s inequalities in the 1960s much effort has gone into distinguishing various senses
of  ‘locality.’  If  we  speak,  with  Einstein,  of  the  ‘mutually  independent  existence  of
spatially distant things’, we formulate a principle of spatial separability. (See [Einstein
1948] transl. in [Howard 1993, 238]) In view of the results of quantum mechanics, we
must  distinguish  this  principle  of  separability  from  the  principle  of  locality.  This
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principle has been formulated in a number of ways. Einstein locality means that no
‘faster-than-light-signals’  should  be  permitted  to  propagate  between  spatially
separated  quantum  systems.  But  locality  can  also  mean  that  a  spin  measurement
performed on one system, which is  spatially  separated from another system in the
sense of satisfying Einstein locality, cannot influence the spin state of the other system.
This type of locality Einstein calls the ‘principle of local action’.
17 However various types of entanglement have been observed between quantum systems,
which display degrees of correlations of their spin properties even though they are
spatially separated in the sense of Einstein locality. Einstein’s principle of local action is
violated  in  quantum  mechanics.  [Cushing  &  McMullin  1989]  [Howard  2004,  § 5]
Schrödinger  dubbed  this  now  familiar  type  of  correlation  ‘entanglement  of  our
predictions  or  of  our  knowledge’  concerning  the  quantum states  of  a  photon pair.
[Schrödinger  1935,  827]  Recently,  the  programme  of  decoherence  has  identified
environmental  entanglement,  i.e.  the  irreversible  loss  of  interference  terms  to  the
environment in the creation of classical states. Quantum mechanics was Einstein’s bête
noire.  His  opposition  never  faltered.  Today  it  is  generally  regarded  as  untenable.
Quantum systems manifest  degrees of  entanglement over large distances.  Einstein’s
‘spooky action-at-a distance’ is a laboratory reality.
18 We see in Einstein’s work both the role of presuppositions (causality in QM) and the
effect of scientific discoveries on fundamental notions (time, space, mass). Less well-
known is that Einstein makes some significant contributions to our understanding of
scientific theories.  In particular his views harbour a possible solution to the vexing
question of the representational power of scientific theories.
 
V. The Representational Nature of Scientific Theories
19 To Einstein, scientific constructs (laws, models, and theories) are free inventions of the
human  mind.  No  amount  of  inductive  generalizations  can  lead  from  empirical
phenomena to the complicated equations of the theory of relativity. But science is not
fiction.  Science  assumes  the  existence  of  an  external  world.  Scientific  theories  are
statements  about  the  external  world.  ‘Physics  is  the  attempt  at  the  conceptual
construction of a model of the real world,  as well as its lawful structure.’ (Quoted in
[Fine 1986, 97], italics in original) Einstein therefore depicts scientific knowledge as a
synthesis of reason and experience, which raises the question of the representational
nature of scientific constructs.
20 Einstein  makes  a  famous  distinction  between  constructive theories  and  principle
theories.  [Einstein  1919;  Miller,  1998,  125]  The  role  of  a  constructive  theory  is  to
propose models, which assign an underlying structure to the observable phenomena.
The kinetic theory of gases models gas molecules as if they were billiard balls. Early
atom models  modelled atoms as  if they were tiny planetary systems.  The role  of  a
principle theory is to propose fundamental principles: the laws of thermodynamics, the
principles of relativity, of covariance and invariance, and the constancy of light. These
principles  constitute  constraints  on  the  construction  of  models  and  theories.  They
forbid the occurrence of  physical  events,  like superluminary velocities or perpetual
motion machines.
21 All scientific theories give rise to a philosophical question: how do scientific theories
relate to the external world? Ernst Mach’s answer is cast in terms of phenomenalism;
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Duhem’s answer in terms of holism; Poincaré’s answer in terms of conventionalism.
Einstein’s  answer  was  influenced  by  these  authors  but  it  was  also  particularly
pragmatic, e.g., it was shaped by his work on relativity. Firstly, Einstein was primarily
concerned with what he called principle theories, like the theory of relativity. Here the
role of constraints comes to the fore. Einstein often declares the world of experience as
the final arbiter of the validity of scientific theories. In Popperian fashion he regarded
all scientific theories as falsifiable. But empirical evidence, in the theory of relativity, is
only one form of constraint. Scientific theories present hypothetical ‘pictures’ of the
external  world.  But  Einstein  was  no  naïve  realist.  A  scientific  theory  constructs  a
coherent and logically rigid account of the available empirical data. Logical consistency
was Einstein’s  second constraint  on theories  since he believed in the mathematical
simplicity of nature. [Einstein 1933, 274] The coherence of a theory may always come
under  threat  with  new  empirical  discoveries.  There  is  nothing  final  about  the
representation of a scientific theory of the external world. Theories are free inventions,
yet they must retain roots in the empirical world. Does this mean that there is always a
plethora of competing theoretical accounts, which nevertheless are compatible with
the available evidence? If this were the case scientific theories would face the serious
problem of underdetermination. That is, there would always be a number of theories,
which are able to explain the empirical evidence, although they fundamentally disagree
about  their  theoretical  structure.  For  instance  the  Copernican  model  of  the  solar
system  (1543)  explains  the  same  observational  evidence  as  the  Ptolemaic  account
although the Copernican model is based on the principle of heliocentrism, while the
Ptolemaic  account embraces the principle  of  geocentrism.  In this  situation Einstein
recommends pragmatically to distinguish a logical from a practical point of view. From
the logical point of view, Einstein grants that there are always numerous theoretical
accounts, which could in principle account for the available evidence. For there seems
to be no limit to the number of competing constructions, which, at least in principle,
could claim to give a coherent and simple account of the available phenomena. This is
due to the fact that theories are the result of human ingenuity. Yet in practice, the
number  of  available  theories  is  always  limited.  Einstein  did  not  believe  that  many
competing representations of the empirical  world could be sustained. He goes even
further:  he believes that  there is  one correct  theory.  The structure of  the external
world has the power to eliminate many rival accounts. The surviving theory displays
such a degree of rigidity that any modification in it will lead to its falsehood. ‘Rigidity
here means that the theory is either true or false but not modifiable.’ [Einstein 1950b,
350; 1936] (cf. [Hentschel 1992], [Scheibe 1992] and [Weinberg 1993]) Einstein illustrates
the  lack  of  underdetermination,  from  the practical  perspective  of  the  working
physicist, by the analogy of solving a crossword puzzle. Although we are free to insert
any word into the columns and rows of a word puzzle, this freedom is very restricted.
Only one word will ‘fit’, only one word will solve ‘the puzzle in all its forms.’ [Einstein
1936, § 1] The structure of the external world practically determines the form of the
theoretical system. [Einstein 1918b; 1933]
22 Going beyond Einstein it will also be useful to split the space of possible theories or
models into alternative and rival accounts. Alternative accounts, like the Schrödinger
and  Heisenberg  pictures  in  quantum  mechanics  are  mathematically  equivalent;
covariant formulations of physical laws in the General theory of relativity are form-
invariant. They pose no problem in terms of underdetermination. Rival accounts like
Lorentz’s and Einstein’s models of the kinematics of reference systems are based on
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incompatible  theoretical  principles.  Lorentz’s  account  of  time  dilation  and  length
contraction  postulates  an  absolute  rest  frame,  whilst  Einstein’s  motivation  was  to
abandon  all  need  for  absolute  reference  frames.  Rival  accounts  therefore  pose  a
problem from the  point  of  view of  underdetermination.  In  the  practice  of  science,
however, there is little underdetermination. How can this be explained? If we look at
Einstein’s philosophical writings about physics, we notice his insistence on constraints
such as unification and the logical simplicity of a theory; he also holds that evidence is
the final arbiter of a theory’s fate. Einstein locality, logical simplicity and unification
are  methodological constraints,  since  they  are  principles  of  the  methods  of  science.
Compatibility with available and new evidence is an empirical constraint. In the present
context the methodological constraints are of lesser importance than some of the other
constraints, which are associated with the theory of relativity. Looking at Einstein’s
way of doing physics, we notice his employment of a number of theoretical constraints,
since they derive more particularly from the theories of relativity. In particular, as we
shall see, the light postulate, relativity principles, covariance and invariance principles.
We can characterize constraints as restrictive conditions of an empirical or theoretical
kind,  which  descriptive  and  explanatory  accounts  must  satisfy  to  count  as  viable
candidates for the scientific description and explanation of the natural world.  With
respect  to  the  theory  of  relativity,  Einstein  holds  that  the  interplay  of  specific
constraints—like covariance, invariance, relativity—creates a fit of the theory or model
with the evidence extracted from the external world. Any modification, he holds, would
destroy  the  coherence  of  the  theory  of  relativity.  [Einstein  1918b;  1919;  1933]  This
provides a clue to a solution of the puzzle of how theories manage to represent the
world. A theory ‘represents’ a section of the empirical world, if it satisfies a certain
number  of  constraints.  The  representation  is  illustrated  in  terms  of  fit,  as  in  the
analogy of the crossword puzzle. But ‘fit’ should be understood in terms of satisfaction
of  constraints.  [Weinert  2006]  The  representation  is  not  an  image,  nor  need  it  be
perfect or absolute.
In order that thinking might not degenerate into ‘metaphysics’, or into empty talk
it is only necessary that enough propositions of the conceptual system be firmly
enough connected with sensory experiences  and that  the conceptual  system,  in
view of its task of ordering and surveying sense-experience, should show as much
unity and parsimony as possible. [Einstein 1944, 289]
23 We have thus assigned to  pure reason and experience their  places  in  a  theoretical
system of physics. The structure of the systems is the work of reason; the empirical
contents and their mutual relations must find their representation in the conclusions
of  the  theory.  In  the  possibility  of  such  a  representation  lies  the  sole  value  and
justification  of  the  whole  system,  and  especially  of  the  concepts  and  fundamental
principles which underlie it. [Einstein 1933, 272]
24 As it  changes with the changing nature of  constraints,  fit  comes in degrees.  In the
simplest case, a model represents the topologic structure of a system; e.g. a heliocentric
scale  model  of  the  solar  system represents  the  spatial  arrangement  of  the  planets
around the sun. The models used in the theory of relativity are more sophisticated
structural  models,  which  combine  a  topologic  with  an  algebraic  structure.  The
algebraic  structure  of  the model  expresses  the mathematical  relations  between the
components of the model. Consider, for instance, Einstein’s thought experiment, which
involves two discs whose circumference and diameter are to be measured. [Einstein
1920, 80; 1922a, 58–9] Let the discs be arranged in such a manner that disc B rotates
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uniformly about a common axis with disc A. This is its topologic aspect. But the main
interest lies in the algebraic structure, e.g., how the parameters on the two discs will be
measured. To carry out the measurements, measuring rods are placed along the radius
and  tangentially  to  the  edge  of  the  disc.  A does  not  rotate  so  that  the  ratio  of
circumference to diameter is equal to π. From the point of view of A the ratio C/D on B
will  be  greater  than  π.  Due  to  length  contraction  of  the  tangential  rods  the
circumference will appear greater on B than on A. Now place two similar clocks on B,
one at the centre, C1 and one at the periphery, C2. Judged from A, C2 will go slower than
C1.  We  may  assume  that  no  faulty  instruments  are  involved.  These  respective
measurements  are  objective.  Observers  on  the  respective  discs  will  regard  their
respective measurements as accurate. Mathematically, the thought experiment stresses
the effect of motion on the measurement of the parameters. Note that the algebraic
structure implied by Euclidean geometry fails  and must  be replaced by a  structure
provided by Riemannian geometry.
25 Let the empirical facts, methodological principles and theoretical postulates constitute
a  constraint  space.  The  theory  of  relativity  satisfies  a  number  of  empirical  and
theoretical constraints, which improve its fit to the external world. The empirical facts
comprise Einstein  famous  predictions:  the  red  shift  of  light  as  a  function  of
gravitational  field strengths and the bending of  light  rays  in the vicinity  of  strong
gravitational  fields.  He  also  explains  the  perihelion  advance  of  Mercury  and  other
planets. In the theory of relativity the most important theoretical constraints are the
following:
 
1) The postulation of the constancy of the speed of light
26 It had been known since Roemer’s first determination of the speed of light in 1675 that
light propagates at a finite velocity of approximately 300 000 km/s. Einstein turned this
value  into  a  theoretical  postulate  such  that  the  speed  of  light  becomes  the  limit
velocity,  which  no  material  particle  can  reach.  In  the  language  of  the  Minkowski
representation of space-time this means that from any event, E, light signals converge
from the past and diverge into the future at a constant speed, forming past and future
cones. All inertial observers will see the angle of convergence and divergence inclined
at 45° to the vertical. The light cones do not tilt. And all observers measure the same
velocity for c, irrespective of the direction and their state of motion with respect to the
light source.
 
2) Principles of Relativity
27 Einstein began his 1905 paper on the Special theory of relativity by a consideration of
standard  attempts  to  explain  Faraday’s  induction  current.  He  complained  that
according to the then current view an asymmetry of explanation for an observationally
indistinguishable phenomenon occurred. If the coil is in motion with respect to the
magnet at rest (in the ether), the charges in the coil experience a magnetic force, which
pushes the electrons around the coil, inducing a current. If the magnet is in motion
with respect to a coil at rest, the magnetic force is no longer the cause of the current,
for no magnetic force applies to charges at rest. The magnet now produces an electric
field in the coil, resulting in the current. To avoid this asymmetry of explanation—an
asymmetry  not  present  in  the  phenomena—Einstein  postulated  the  physical
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equivalence of reference frames. In its general form the principle of relativity states
that  all  coordinate  systems,  which  represent  physical  systems  in  (uniform or  non-
uniform) motion with respect to each other, must be equivalent from the physical point
of view. [Einstein 1920, 59, 97–8] In other words, the laws which govern the changes
that happen to physical systems in motion with respect to each other are independent
of the particular coordinate system, to which these changes are referred. So it is not
admissible that an induced current is explained differently, depending on whether the
magnet or the coil is in motion.
 
3) Invariance and Symmetries
28 We can understand reference frames (in the STR) as idealized physical systems whose
space-time coordinates are given by rigid rods and idealized clocks. They are subject to
various  symmetry  operations,  like  rotation  or  translation  in  space  and  time.  The
Special  theory  obeys  the  Lorentz-transformations,  because  the  Galilean
transformations fail as we approach the speed of light. The Galilean transformations,
for  instance,  result  in  different  values  for  the  speed of  light,  if  we  change  from a
stationary to a moving reference frame. The Lorentz-transformations deal with space-
time transformations of a global kind; that is, they are constant throughout the space-
time  region.  They  form  a  symmetry  group.  (The  General  theory  requires  a  larger
symmetry  group.)  Symmetry  constraints  emphasize  physical  aspects:  the  symmetry
operations return some values of parameters as invariant (like the space-time interval)
and leave others as variant (like the clock readings in different reference frames, in
constant motion with respect to each other). Symmetries result from transformations
that  leave  all  relevant  structure  intact.  We  are  familiar  with  such  symmetry
transformations in daily life. We easily change the clock as we travel between different
time zones. But the tennis games we play at home and abroad are the same as far as the
physical parameters are concerned.
 
4) Covariance
29 Covariance is prima facie a mathematical constraint. The modern use is quite different
from the way Einstein uses the notion of covariance.  Einstein associates covariance
with the transformation rules of the theory of relativity.
30 He imposes on the laws of physics the condition that they must be covariant a) with
respect to the Lorentz transformations (in the Special theory of relativity) [Einstein
1949c, 8; 1950, 346] and b) to general transformations of the coordinate systems (in the
General  theory).  [Einstein 1920,  54–63;  1950,  347]  The theory of  relativity  will  only
permit laws of physics, which will remain covariant with respect to these coordinate
transformations. [Einstein 1930, 145–6] This means that the laws must retain their form
(‘Gestalt’) ‘for coordinate systems of any kind of states of motion.’ [Einstein 1940, 922]
They must be formulated in such a manner that their expressions are equivalent in
coordinate systems of any state of motion. [Einstein 1916; 1920, 42–3, 153; 1922a, 8–9;
1940, 922; 1949a, 69] A change from coordinate system, K, to coordinate system, K', by
permissible transformations, must not change the form of the physical laws. This leads
to the characterization of covariance as form invariance. [Weinert 2007a] Einstein often
illustrates covariance with respect to the space-time interval ds2. [Einstein 1922a, 28] In
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Minkowski  space-time,  the  space-time  interval  ds2 is  expressed  as  an  invariant
expression in what remains essentially a quasi-Euclidean space:
31 2.6  If  the  expression  satisfies  covariance  it  must  remain  form-invariant  under  the
substitution of a different coordinate system, i.e.,
ds2 = 0 = ds'2: 
32 The equation for the space-time interval, ds, remains form-invariant if K is substituted
by another quasi-Euclidean inertial frame, K', as indicated by the coordinates Δx'ν. For
Einstein a fit must exist between the theory of relativity and the material world. We
explicated fit in terms of the satisfaction of constraints, associated with the theory of
relativity.  If  their  amount  and their  interconnections  can be  increased,  then many
scientific theories will fail to satisfy the constraints. It will usually leave us with only
one  plausible  survivor.  For  instance,  after  the  development  of  the  Special  theory,
Einstein increased the constraints on an admissible relativity theory. Inertial reference
frames  should  not  be  privileged  over  non-inertial  frames.  This  extension  of  the
relativity  principle  and  the  demand  of  covariance  lead  to  the  General  theory  of
relativity. This theory was able to explain the perihelion advance of Mercury, where
Newtonian mechanics had failed. It would be exaggerated to claim that there is such a
tight fit between the theory and the world, that there is a one-to-one mapping of the
theoretical  with  the  empirical  elements.  Einstein,  in  fact,  rejected  naïve  realism.
[Einstein 1944, 280–1] Due to the need for approximations and idealizations there will
always be theoretical structure, for which there is no direct empirical evidence. For
instance, the evidence does not tell us whether space-time exists, devoid of all matter.
But Einstein holds that one theory always satisfies the constraints better than its rivals.
It  does  not  follow  from  this  argument  that  the  survivor—let  us  say  the  theory  of
relativity—will be true. It does follow that the process of elimination will leave us with
the  most  adequate  theoretical  account  presently  available.  New  experimental  or
observational  evidence  may  force  us  to  abandon  this  survivor.  The  desire  for
unification and logical simplicity may persuade us to develop alternative theoretical
accounts. Einstein’s attempt to extend the principle of relativity from its restriction in
the Special theory to inertial reference frames to non-inertial reference frame in the
General theory is a case in point. Although Einstein does claim that there is one correct
theory,  he  cannot  mean  this  in  an  absolute  sense.  His  insistence  on  the  eternal
revisability  of  scientific  theories,  including  constraints,  speaks  against  this
interpretation. What he must mean is that there is always one theory, at any one point,
which  best  fits  the  available  evidence.  This  one  theory  copes  best  with  all  the
constraints,  which logic and evidence erect;  but there is nothing final about such a
theory; it will always remain falsifiable.
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VI. What is Einstein’s philosophical allegiance?
33 He has been appropriated by neo-Kantians, realists, positivists and holists alike. Each
camp can claim textual evidence for its preferred interpretation [Frank 1949] [Holton
1965;  1973]  [Howard,  1990;  1993;  2004].  In  a  number  of  papers,  Don Howard  has
promoted the view that Einstein agreed with Duhem’s underdetermination thesis, and
generally adopted a holist view of theory confirmation, e.g. only a theory as a whole
body of statements faces the verdict of experimental evidence. [Howard 1990; 1993]
This view implies the denial of crucial experiments, and a certain latitude of choice of
conceptual  elements  with  respect  to  the  empirical  evidence.  It  is  akin  to
conventionalist ideas associated with Poincaré. According to this interpretation there
exist logically incompatible theories, which nevertheless are equally compatible with
the evidence. The question is whether Einstein’s way of doing physics is compatible
with this strong holist interpretation.
34 If  we look at  the development of  the theory of  relativity,  we notice that  there are
several problems with this holist interpretation. Einstein’s insistence that at any one
point in the history of science only one rival theory is the most adequate theory (alone
capable of satisfying all the constraints) suggests that confirmation holism does not
necessarily  imply  the  existence  of  equally  good  competitors,  e.g. observationally
indistinguishable but ontologically divergent theories. In particular, Einstein’s work on
relativity  shows  that  other  than  empirical  constraints  are  at  hand  to  distribute
credibility unevenly over the space of possible theories. Einstein actually employs these
constraints,  as  we  have  seen,  to  argue  in  favour  of  the  relativity  theory.  In  his
discussion of the rotating disc thought experiment, Einstein explicitly avoids saving
Euclidean geometry ‘come what may’, although this is a conventionalist stratagem.
35 We should also note that neither Duhem nor Quine were the complete holists they are
made out to be. Discussions of holism usually highlight the radical underdetermination
of an entire theory by empirical evidence. [Howard 1993] It is often overlooked that
both Duhem and Quine accepted the coherence of scientific theories as a constraint, as
much  as  Einstein  did.  According  to  this  aspect,  theories  are  structured  conceptual
systems, which entertain many mathematical and conceptual interrelations between
them. This aspect makes the deducibility of  empirical  laws from more fundamental
laws possible. Duhem, for instance, appeals to an analogy of science with an organism,
in which one part cannot be made to function except when the parts that are most
remote from it are called into play, some more than others, but all to some degree.
[Duhem 1954, 187–8] [Weinert 1995]
36 The coherence aspect corresponds to Einstein’s insistence on the rigidity of scientific
theories,  for  which  he  uses  the  analogy  of  the  crossword  puzzle  (Section  V).  This
rigidity shows that changes in one part of  the theory will  affect other parts of  the
theory, so that the ‘latitude of choice’ is more restricted than holism is ready to admit.
The presence of constraints and the concern for ‘fit’ point in the direction of a stronger
form of  realism.  Einstein is  fond of  the view that  theoretical  constructions are not
inductive  generalizations  from experience  but  free  inventions  of  the  human mind.
Nevertheless there must be a ‘fit’ between the theoretical expressions and the external
world.  This  fit  is  achieved  in  the  theory  of  relativity,  we  suggested,  through  the
introduction of  constraints.  The  increase  in  constraints—extension of  the  relativity
principle to non-inertial motion, the introduction of the principle of equivalence and
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the form-invariance of laws (covariance principle)—takes Einstein from the STR to the
GTR. If there is indeed a ‘fit’ between what the theory says and what the material world
presents, the question of realism returns.
37 Consider, for instance, Einstein’s view of Poincaré’s conventionalism about geometry.
Einstein reflected on the status of geometry in the light of the GTR. [Einstein 1921;
1922b] He distinguishes an axiomatic and a practical geometry. He agrees with Poincaré
that the laws of axiomatic geometry are based on conventional choices, say in favour of
Euclidean geometry and its axioms. But Einstein sees an important difference between
an axiomatic and a practical geometry: the former makes no reference to the world of
experience, whilst the latter does.
The question whether the practical geometry of the universe is Euclidean or not,
has a clear meaning, and its answer can only be furnished by experience. [Einstein
1922b, 23]
38 According  to  Einstein  this  view  of  geometry  was  an  essential  prerequisite  for  the
development of the GTR.
The question whether the structure of [the four-dimensional] continuum [of space-
time] is Euclidian, or in accordance with Riemann’s general scheme, or otherwise,
is,  according  to  the  view  which  is  here  being  advocated,  properly  speaking  a
physical question which must be answered by experience, and not a question of
mere convention to be selected on practical grounds. [Einstein 1922b, 39]
39 What counterbalances the strong holist interpretation of Einstein’s views is Einstein’s
repeated insistence that out of many rival theories there is one with the most adequate
fit and that practical geometry allows fewer conventional elements than Poincaré is
ready  to  concede. From  the  point  of  view  of  Einstein’s  problem  situation,  his
philosophical attitude was characterized during his lifetime as a form of critical realism.
Einstein certainly approved of this way, in which Lenzen and Northrop characterized
his epistemological position (See [Lenzen 1949] [Northrop 1949] [Einstein 1949b, 683]).
It simply regards scientific theories as hypothetical constructs, free inventions of the
human mind. But there is also an external world, irrespective of human awareness. To
be  scientific,  theories  are  required  to  represent  reality.  They  represent  reality  by
satisfying both empirical and theoretical constraints. A theory is not a mirror image of
the  world.  It  is  a  mathematical  representation,  which  provides  coherence  of  the
empirical  data  and  shows  their  interconnections.  Theories  are  hypothetical,
approximate  constructions,  which  in  a  process  of  fitting  and  refitting,  deliver  a
coherent  picture  of  the external  world.  In  human efforts  to  understand the world,
experience and reason go hand in hand. In modern terms, Einstein’s relativity theory
may be characterized as leading to a form of structural realism. [Weinert 2007b] The
relativity theories are principle theories, which employ general coordinate systems to
explain  the  behaviour  of  physical  systems  in  uniform  or  accelerated  motion  with
respect to each other. Such coordinate systems are well-suited to represent physical
systems, since they can be regarded as structural models of the target systems. Physical
systems typically display structures, consisting of relata and relations. As the models of
the relativity theories are able to represent both the topologic and algebraic aspects
inherent in physical systems, they can be said to represent the structure of physical
systems. Einstein declares that ‘the concepts of physics refer to a real external world,
i.e.,  ideas  are  posited  of  things  that  claim  a  ‘real  existence’  independent  of  the
perceiving subject (bodies, fields etc.)’ [Einstein 1948, 321, transl. Howard, 1993, 238]
These  representational  claims  cover  both  the  relata  (fields,  material  particles,
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reference frames) and the relations (the mathematical relations between the relata).
Given that scientific theories manage to represent aspects of the external world, what
picture of reality does the relativity theory espouse?
 
VII. What is Reality? 
40 The structural realist makes the assumption that there is a structured external material
world. Theories which ‘fit’ a domain of this external world present us with a view of
physical reality. Such views have changed with the progression of physical theories.
There was a time when physicists liked to think of the world as a massive clockwork.
Particles populated the universe. Only their primary qualities mattered. They were at
rest or in constant regular motion. Einstein suspected that this classical picture was
mistaken. It required Newton’s absolute space and time and action at a distance. For
Einstein,  physicists  like  Heinrich Hertz,  Michael Faraday  and  James Maxwell  made
significant steps in the revision of the physical worldview when they introduced fields
as fundamental physical entities. Einstein regarded the theory of relativity as a field
theory,  which  dispenses  with action  at  a  distance.  But  Einstein  was  never  able  to
overcome the fundamental dualism in the physical worldview between particles and
fields. This may be the reason why we find in Einstein’s work two concepts of physical
reality. In his relativistic thinking about the nature of reality, Einstein became one of
the first physicists to realize the significance of symmetries and invariance in science
as a new criterion of what the physicist should regard as objective and physically real.
41 The starting point is the principle of relativity. In the STR it states that all reference
systems, which represent physical systems in motion with respect to each other, must
be equivalent from the physical point of view. But we have already observed that in the
transition from one reference system to another some properties change. The classic
examples  are  temporal  and  spatial  measurements,  as  well  as  mass  determinations.
From  the  phenomenon  of  time  dilation  and  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  some
physicists concluded that time cannot be a physical property of the universe. Some
transitions to other reference systems do not, however, affect the physical properties.
The classic example is the velocity of light in vacuum. The Special theory of relativity
postulates that the value of ‘c’  will be the same in all time-like connected reference
systems,  which  move  at  constant  speed  with  respect  to  each  other.  Some physical
properties  are  immune to  changes  in  reference  systems,  while  others  are  not.  The
velocity of light is the same in all directions and irrespective of whether it is emitted
from  a  moving  or  stationary  source.  But  the  wavelengths  of  light  depend  on  the
movement  of  the  source  (Doppler Effect).  Symmetry  principles,  like  the  geometric
symmetries of the STR, show the invariant aspects of the equations, which apply to
Minkowski  space-time.  While  in  classical  physics,  many properties,  like  time,  mass,
space,  energy were regarded as  ‘absolute’,  in the Special  theory of  relativity,  many
properties  became  relational.  Relational  means  that  they  cannot  be  considered  in
abstraction from the coordinate values in particular reference frames. So the question
arises, ‘What is real?’ For it seems that if two observers disagree about the length of an
object  or  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of  an  event,  they  cannot  both  be  right.  An
object, so it appears to us, cannot have two different lengths at the same time.
42 But we need to take into consideration the lessons of relativity.
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43 The answer to the question of reality is embedded in the mathematics of the Special
theory  of  relativity.  Minkowski’s  four-dimensional  interpretation  of  space-time
provided Einstein with a new criterion for the physically real. Physics, he says, deals
with ‘events’ in space and time. [Einstein 1949c] Temporal and spatial measurements
varied from reference frame to reference frame. They could not be physically real. But
the space-time interval, ds, remained invariant for every observer. It was therefore to
be regarded as real. [Einstein 1920 App. II, 1922a, 23–31; 1936, 34-41] [Scheibe 1981] In
general, what a scientific theory tells us to regard as ‘real’ is what remains invariant in
transitions  between  different  reference  frames.  These  transitions  are  governed  by
transformation  groups.  In  the  STR  the  Lorentz  transformations  take  us  from  one
reference system to another. They state how the spatial and temporal coordinates of
one reference systems translate into another. As we change between various reference
systems, say, from stationary to constantly moving systems, the laws of physics express
invariant properties of physical systems, like the space-time interval of equation (1).
Einstein at first considered inertial systems and later accelerated systems. The laws of
physics must retain their form (remain covariant) under the substitution of coordinate
systems through all transformations. [Norton 1989; 1993] What remains invariant is to
be regarded as the physically real.
44 More  specifically  Einstein  advanced  his  ‘point-coincidence  argument’.  Einstein
explicitly claims that the laws of physics are statements about space-time coincidences.
In fact only such statements can ‘claim physical existence’. [Einstein 1918a, 241; 1920,
95]  [Norton 1992,  298]  As  a  material  point  moves  through space-time its  reference
frame is marked by a large number of co-ordinate values x1, x2, x3, x4. This is true of any
material point in motion. It is only where the space-time coordinates of the frames
intersect  that  they  ‘have  a  particular  system  of  coordinate  values  x1,  x2,  x3,  x4  in
common’.  [Einstein 1916a,  86;  1920,  95]  In terms of  observers,  attached to different
reference  systems,  it  is  at  such  points  of  encounters  that  they  can  agree  on  the
temporal  and  spatial  measurements.  Many  physicists  concluded  as  a  philosophical
consequence of the relativity theory that only the invariant can be the physically real.
[Eddington 1920] [Weyl 1921] [Born 1953] [Dirac 1958] [Wigner 1967, Part I]  [Planck
1975]
45 However,  as  Born  pointed  out  frame-dependent  properties  may  also  lay  claim  to
reality.  [Born  1953]  [Weinert  2004,  ch.  2.8]  Clock  and  meter  readings  in  particular
reference frames are not perceptual illusions of observers. These measurements have
perspectival reality since they are relational. They are relational in the sense that they
must  be  derived  from  the  coordinate  values  of  particular  reference  frames.  Born
compared the perspectival realities to projections, which are defined in a number of
‘equivalent systems of reference’.
In every physical theory there is a rule which connects projections of the same
object on different systems of reference,  called a law of transformation,  and all
these transformations have the property of forming a group, i.e. the sequence of
two consecutive transformations is a transformation of the same kind. Invariants
are quantities having the same value for any system of reference, hence they are
independent of the transformations. [Born 1953, 144]
46 The Lorentz transformations show, Born adds, that quantities
like distances in rigid systems, time intervals shown by clocks in different positions,
masses  of  bodies,  are  now  found  to  be  projections,  components  of  invariant
quantities not directly accessible. [Born 1953, 144]
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47 This leads to a modified view of physical  reality,  which is  still  compatible with the
Minkowski presentation of the theory of relativity. It admits both frame-dependent and
frame-independent realities. The invariant is not the only reality but it is the focus of
physics. What now becomes of the criterion that only the invariant is to be regarded as
real? It derives from the fact that physics is not interested in perspectival realities.
Physics  is  interested  in  the  underlying  structures,  which  relate  the  different
perspectives.  Relativistic  physics  is  interested  in  the  structure  of  space-time.  This
structure can be described mathematically, as Minkowski has done. It will tell us that
the space-time interval, ds,  is invariant across the reference systems. The particular
perspectives  then  result  from  attaching  clocks  and  rods  to  the  world  lines,  which
crisscross  space-time.  Once  the  symmetries  tell  us  what  remains  invariant  across
reference frames, it is not difficult to derive the perspectival aspects, which attach to
different  reference  frames,  as  a  function  of  velocity.  The  theory  of  relativity  led
Einstein  to  an  invariance  view  of  reality.  But  his  opposition  to  the  Copenhagen
interpretation of QM led him to a more classical separability view of reality: spatially
separated system, A and B,  which obey Einstein locality, possess physical properties,
which are not immediately affected by external influences on either of the systems.
[Einstein 1948]
 
VIII. Philosophy and Science
48 Philosophical  consequences  do  not  flow  from  scientific  theories  with  logical
compulsion.  Nevertheless,  certain kinds of  philosophical  positions are more akin to
scientific findings than others. For instance, a belief in Newton’s absolute space and
time and the invariance of mass has become incompatible with the findings of STR. An
adherence to Euclidean geometry has become incompatible with the GTR. Einstein’s
belief  in  deterministic  causality  and  the  principle  of  local  action  has  become
questionable in the light of QM. He once accused philosophers of dragging concepts
into the den of the a priori.
Philosophers  had  a  harmful  effect  upon  the  progress  of  scientific  thinking  in
removing  certain  fundamental  concepts  from the  domain  of  empiricism,  where
they are under our control, to the intangible heights of the a priori. [Einstein 1922a,
2, italics in original]
49 Sometimes,  however,  the very foundations of science become shaky. This happened
twice in Einstein’s lifetime: relativity and quantum theory. Then the physicist himself is
forced to become a philosopher through a ‘critical contemplation of the theoretical
foundations’.  The philosopher-scientist  is  a  familiar  figure in the history of  science
(Newton,  Leibniz,  Darwin,  Bohr,  Born,  Duhem,  Planck,  Poincaré).  Max  Born  gave
expression to the role of the philosopher-scientist when he wrote that
History has shown that science has played a leading part in the development of
human thought. [Born 1949, 75]
50 This philosophical turn of scientists is due to a basic epistemological situation in the
sciences,  of  which  Einstein  was  very  aware:  the  need  to  map  symbolic  systems
(theories, models, equations) onto an independently existing reality. This mapping has
to  satisfy  criteria  of  ‘fit’.  If  the  scientific  discoveries  are  sufficiently  profound,
conceptual  consequences  become  unavoidable  because  they  touch  on  our  most
profound physico-philosophical notions (determinism, nature, time etc.). A need arises
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to rethink these fundamental notions; Einstein and other philosopher-scientists did not
shirk  from  this  task.  A  philosopher-scientist  is  someone  who  in  Einstein’s  words
considers the career of ‘certain fundamental concepts’ within the problem situation, in
which they arise. The problem situation may be the kinematics of reference systems or
the evolutionary theory. The physico-philosophical concepts need to be reassessed in
the  light  of  scientific  discoveries,  because  they  acted  as  unquestioned  assumptions
prior to the new discovery. In Einstein’s case these were concepts like mass, space and
time, the nature of physical reality and of scientific theories. In such reassessments the
scientist turns to more conceptual issues, which are no longer deductive consequences
of  the  theory.  As  Einstein  realized,  when  the  foundations  of  science  become
problematic,  the  man  of  science  becomes  a  philosopher.  [Einstein  1936,  § 1]  The
philosophical  legacy  of  Einstein’s  scientific  work  is  immense.  It  ranges  from
metaphysics to the philosophy of physics. The theory of relativity demonstrates clearly
how  difficult  the  relationship  between  facts  and  concepts  has  become.  We  cannot
simply cling to the concepts, irrespective of what experiment and observation tell us.
This was Einstein’s charge against Newton and Lorentz. Ironically it also reflects his
own difficulties with quantum mechanics, since he relies on notions like determinism
and separability. Nor can we simply inductively generalize from the facts, neglecting
the concepts. Therefore Einstein believed in the importance of theoretical thinking and
the  power  of  constraints.  As  Einstein  realized  himself,  science  makes  philosophical
presuppositions. The scientist needs philosophical ideas, simply because amongst the
experimental  and  mathematical  tools  in  the  toolbox  of  the  scientist  there  are
conceptual tools, like the fundamental notions. Philosophical presuppositions can both
guide and misguide the scientist. When the philosophical presuppositions change as a
result of scientific discoveries, science does not dictate to philosophy the answers. But
it constrains the philosophical consequences, which follow.
51 The philosophical consequences include such questions as to which extent the Special
theory  is  compatible  with  objective  becoming  or  static  being.  Then  there  was  the
question  of  determinism  in  the  interpretations  of  quantum  mechanics,  and  the
question of causal relations between entangled quantum systems. There is the issue of
the representational nature of theories, more precisely the question of fit, which we
interpreted as the requirement for the satisfaction of certain constraints. Finally, the
philosophical notion of physical reality must be in harmony with the scientific findings.
The ‘point-coincidence argument’ therefore led physicists to the invariance criterion of
physical reality but Einstein’s notion of ‘local action’ (no-action-at-a-distance) has not
found the approval of quantum physicists. Einstein’s work has shown that there is a
genuine interaction between science and philosophy. Every true theorist is a ‘tamed
metaphysicist’.  [Einstein 1936 17;  1950b,  342]  We have seen how Einstein’s  physical
problem situation lead to  philosophical  consequences.  A  consideration of  Einstein’s
career  as  a  physicist-philosopher  illustrates  Reichenbach’s  observation  that  the
‘evolution  of  philosophical  ideas  is  guided  by  the  evolution  of  physical  theories’.
[Reichenbach 1949, 301]
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ABSTRACTS
The aim of this paper is to provide a readable account of the immense philosophical legacy of
Einstein’s scientific work. Einstein was not a systematic philosopher but his physical thought had
philosophical consequences. In his willingness to pursue the philosophical consequences of his
scientific work, Einstein followed in the footsteps of physicists like Newton, Mach, Planck and
Poincaré. Einstein derived these consequences from the problem-situations, into which his work
as a physicist had led him. These philosophical consequences range from metaphysics to the
philosophy of  physics.  To a certain extent they can be regarded as answers to philosophical
questions. Of particular interest is his view of the representational nature of scientific theories,
in which the notion of constraints plays a significant role. An analysis of the role of constraints in
Einstein’s ‘philosophy of science’ has often been neglected in the literature.
Cet  article  a  pour  objectif  de  présenter  un  compte-rendu  accessible  de  l’immense  héritage
philosophique de l’œuvre scientifique d’Einstein. Einstein n’était pas un philosophe de métier,
mais son raisonnement en sciences physiques portait en soi des conséquences philosophiques
qu’il  était  prêt  à  explorer.  En  explorant  les  conséquences  philosophiques  de  ses  travaux
scientifiques Einstein s’inscrit dans la démarche de physiciens tels que Newton, Mach, Planck et
Poincaré. Einstein déduisait les conséquences philosophiques de la problématique que son travail
de  physicien  faisait surgir.  Ces  conséquences  philosophiques  vont  de  la  métaphysique  à  la
philosophie de la physique. Dans une certaine mesure, ces conséquences philosophiques peuvent
être considérées comme étant des réponses à des questions philosophiques. On peut noter en
particulier, ses vues sur l’aspect représentationnel des théories scientifiques et son insistance, à
leur sujet, sur la notion de contraintes. Les travaux sur Einstein ont souvent négligé l’étude des
contraintes en philosophie des sciences.
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